## Archive for the ‘Hardware’ Category

### Haskell and Hardware for the Holidays

December 18, 2010

Looking to make a statement this holiday season?  You could try to win the office “ugly holiday sweater” contest.  Or, you could play “Jingle Bells” on your Arduino microcontroller, using Haskell.  This post is about the latter.

We’re going to write this small program using the Copilot embedded domain-specific language (on Hackage and the source on Github).  Copilot is a stream language that allows you to generate embedded C code from programs written essentially as Haskell lists (using Atom as a backend for the C code generation).  This post is about how to use Copilot/Haskell (v. 1.0) to make your embedded C programming easier and more likely to be correct.  Here’s what we’re going to do—please don’t look too closely at my soldering, and turn the volume up, since a piezo speaker isn’t loud:

(For the impatient, the Haskell file is here, and the generated .c and .h files are here and here, respectively.)

We’re going to essentially recreate this C/Wiring program, plus flash some LEDs, but hopefully in a easier, safer way.  We need to manage three tasks:

1. Determine the note and number of beats to play.
2. Play the piezo speaker.
3. Flash the LEDs.

We’ll start by defining which pins control what function:

-- pin numbers
speaker, red, green :: Spec Int32
speaker = 13
red     = 12
green   = 11

The type Spec Int32 takes an Int32 and lifts it into a Copilot expression.

We’ll call the program cycleSong. The type of a Copilot program is Streams, which is a collection of Spec as, and it resides within the Writer Monad. First, we’ll declare some variables.

cycleSong :: Streams
cycleSong = do
-- Copilot vars
let idx       = varI32 "idx"
notes     = varI32 "notes"
duration  = varI32 "duration"
odd       = varI32 "odd"
even      = varI32 "even"
playNote  = varB   "playNote"
-- external vars
note = extArrI32 "notes" idx
beat = extArrI32 "beats" idx

There are two classes of variables: Copilot variables that will refer to streams (infinite lists), and external variables, which can refer to data from C (including the return values of functions, global variables, and arrays). The constructors are mnemonics for the type of the variables; for example, varI32 is a variable that will refer to a stream of Int32s. Similarly, extArrI32 is an external variable referring to a C array of Int32s (i.e., int32_t). Notice the idx argument—it is the stream of values from which the index into the array is drawn (constants can also be used for indexes).

Now for the actual program:

 idx      .= [0] ++ (idx + 1) mod (fromIntegral $length notesLst) notes .= note duration .= beat * 300 odd .= mux (idx mod 2 == 1) green red even .= mux (idx mod 2 == 1) red green playNote .= true -- triggers trigger playNote "digitalWrite" (odd <> true) trigger playNote "digitalWrite" (even <> false) trigger playNote "playtone" (speaker <> notes <> duration) And that’s basically it. There are two parts to the program, the definition of Copilot streams, which manage data-flow and control, and triggers, which call an external C function when some property is true. Copilot streams look pretty much like Haskell lists, except that functions are automatically lifted to the stream level for convenience. Thus, instead of writing,  x = [0] ++ map (+1) x in Copilot, you simply write  x .= [0] ++ x + 1 Similarly for constants, so the Copilot stream definition playNote .= true lifts the constant true to an infinite stream of true values. The function mux is if then elsemux refers to a 2-to-1 multiplexer. So that means that the stream odd takes the value of green when idx is odd, and red otherwise, where green and red refer to the pins controlling the respective LEDs. Just to round out the description of the other defined streams, idx is the index into the C arrays containing the notes and beats, respectively—that’s why we perform modular arithmetic. The stream duration tells us how long to hold a note; 300 is a magic “tempo” constant. Now for the triggers. Each of our triggers “fires” whenever the stream playNote is true; in our case, because it is a constant stream of trues, this happens on each iteration. So on each iteration, the C functions digitalWrite and playTone are called with the respective function arguments (‘<>‘ separates arguments). The function digitalWrite is a function that is part of the Wiring language, which is basically C with some standard libraries, from which digitalWrite comes. We’ll write playTone ourselves in a second. ## The C Code We need a little C code now. We could write this directly, but we’ll just do this in Haskell, since there’s so little we need to write—the Copilot program handles most of the work. But a caveat: it’s a little ugly, since we’re just constructing Haskell strings. Here are a few functions (included with Copilot) to make this easier, and here are some more. (If someone properly writes a package to write ad-hoc C code from Haskell, please leave a comment!) First, we need more magic constants to give the frequency associated with notes (a space is a rest). freq :: Char -> Int32 freq note = case note of 'c' -> 1915 'd' -> 1700 'e' -> 1519 ...  and here are the notes of the song and the beats per note: jingleBellsNotes = "eeeeeeegcdefffffeeeddedgeeeeeeegcdefffffeeggfdc" jingleBellsBeats = [ 1,1,2 , 1,1,2, 1,1,1,1, 4 , 1,1,1,1, 1,1,2, 1,1,1,1, 2,2 , 1,1,2 , 1,1,2, 1,1,1,1, 4 , 1,1,1,1, 1,1,2, 1,1,1,1, 4 ] The other main piece of C code we need to write is the function playtone. The piezo speaker is controlled by pulse width modulation, basically meaning we’ll turn it on and off really fast to simulate an analogue signal. Here is it’s definition (using a little helper Haskell function to construct C functions):  [ function "void" "playtone" ["int32_t speaker", "int32_t tone", "int32_t duration"] P.++ "{" , "#ifdef CBMC" , " for (int32_t i = 0; i < 1; i ++) {" , "#else" , " for (int32_t i = 0; i < duration * 1000; i += tone * 2) {" , "#endif" , " digitalWrite(speaker, HIGH);" , " delayMicroseconds(tone);" , " digitalWrite(speaker, LOW);" , " delayMicroseconds(tone);" , " }" , "}" ] HIGH, LOW, digitalWrite, and delayMicroseconds are all part of the Wiring standard library. That ifdef is for verification purposes, which we’ll describe in just a bit. Besides a little more cruft, that’s it! ## Test, Build, Verify “Jersey Shore” may have introduced you to the concept of gym, tan, laundry, but here we’ll stick to test, build, verify. That is, first we’ll test our program using the Copilot interpreter, then we’ll build it, then we’ll prove the memory safety of the generated C program. • Interpret. We define a function that calls the Copilot interpreter: interpreter = interpret cycleSong 20$ setE (emptySM {i32Map = fromList [ ("notes", notesLst)
, ("beats", beatsLst)]})
baseOpts

This calls the Copilot interpreter, saying to unroll cycleSong 20 times. Because the Copilot program samples some external C values, we need to provide that data to the interpreter. Fortunately, we have those arrays already defined as Haskell lists. Executing this, we get the following:

period: 0   duration: 300   even: 11   idx: 0   notes: 1519   odd: 12   playNote: 1
period: 1   duration: 300   even: 12   idx: 1   notes: 1519   odd: 11   playNote: 1
period: 2   duration: 600   even: 11   idx: 2   notes: 1519   odd: 12   playNote: 1
period: 3   duration: 300   even: 12   idx: 3   notes: 1519   odd: 11   playNote: 1
period: 4   duration: 300   even: 11   idx: 4   notes: 1519   odd: 12   playNote: 1
period: 5   duration: 600   even: 12   idx: 5   notes: 1519   odd: 11   playNote: 1
period: 6   duration: 300   even: 11   idx: 6   notes: 1519   odd: 12   playNote: 1
. . .

Good, it looks right. (period isn’t a Copilot variable but just keeps track of what round we’re on.)

• Build. To build, we generate the C code from the Copilot program, then we’ll use a cross-compiler targeting the ATmega328. The easiest way (I’ve found) is via Homin Lee’s Arscons. Arscons is based on Scons, a Python-based build system. Arscons makes three assumptions: (1) the program is written as a Wiring program (e.g., there’s a loop() function instead of a main() function is the main difference), (2) the extension of the Wiring program is .pde, and (3) the directory containing the XXX.pde is XXX. For us, all that really means is that we have to change the extension of the generated program from .c to .pde. So we define
main :: IO ()
main = do
compile cycleSong name
$setPP cCode -- C code for above/below the Copilot program$ setV Verbose -- Verbose compilation
baseOpts
copyFile (name P.++ ".c") (name P.++ ".pde") -- SConstruct expects .pde

and then execute

> runhaskell CopilotSong.hs

to do this.

To build the executable, we issue

> scons

then

scons upload

when we’re ready to flash the microcontroller.

• Verify. Is the generated C program memory safe?  Wait… What do I mean by ‘memory safe’?  I’ll consider the program to be memory safe if the following hold:
• No arithmetic underflows or overflows.
• No floating-point not-a-numbers (NaNs).
• No division by zero.
• No array bounds underflows or overflows.
• No Null pointer dereferences.

Of course this is an approximates memory-safety, but it’s a pretty good start. If the compiler is built correctly, we should be pretty close to a memory-safe program. But we want to check the compiler, even though Haskell’s type system gives us some evidence of guarantees already. Furthermore, the compiler knows nothing about arbitrary C functions, and it doesn’t know how large external C arrays are.

We can prove that the program is memory safe. We call out to CBMC, a C model-checker developed primarily by Daniel Kröning. This is whole-program analysis, so we have to provide the location of the libraries. We define

verifying :: IO ()
verifying =
verify (name P.++ ".c") (length notesLst * 4 + 3)
(     "-DCBMC -I/Applications/Arduino.app/Contents/Resources/Java/hardware/arduino/cores/arduino/ "
P.++ "-I/Applications/Arduino.app/Contents/Resources/Java/hardware/tools/avr/avr-4/include "
P.++ "--function cbmc")

which calls cbmc on our generated C program. Let me briefly explain the arguments. First we give the name of the C program.

Then we say how many times to unroll the loops. This requires a little thinking. We want to unroll the loops enough times to potentially get into a state where we might have an out of bounds array access (recall that the Copilot stream idx generates indexes into the arrays). The length of the C arrays are given by length notesLst. When compiling the Copilot program (calling the module’s main function, a periodic schedule is generated for the program). From the schedule, we can see that idx is updated every fourth pass through the loop. So we unwind it enough loop passes for the counter to have the opportunity to walk off the end of the array, plus a few extra passes for setup. This is a minimum bound; you could of course over-approximate and unroll the loop, say, 1000 times.

Regarding loop unrolling, remember that #ifdef from the definition of playtone()? We include that to reduce the difficulty of loop unrolling. playtone() gets called on every fourth pass through the main loop, and unrolling both loops is just too much for symbolic model-checking (at least on my laptop). So we give ourselves an informal argument that the loop in playtone() won’t introduce any memory safety violations, and the #ifdef gives us one iteration through the loop if we’re verifying the system. A lot of times with embedded code, this is a non-issue, since loops can just be completely unrolled.

The -D flag defines a preprocessor macro, and the -I defines a include path. Finally, the --function flag gives the entry point into the program. Because we generated a Wiring program which generates a while(1) loop for us through macro magic, we have to create an explicit loop ourselves for verification purposes.

If you’re interested in seeing what things look like when they fail, change the idx stream to be

  idx .= [0] ++ (idx + 1)


and cbmc will complain

Violated property:
file CopilotSing.c line 180 function __r11
array beats' upper bound
(long int)__1 < 47

VERIFICATION FAILED


So that’s it. Happy holidays!

November 20, 2010

A lot has been going on since the announcement of Copilot, a Haskell DSL for generating hard real-time C monitors. We’ve presented Copilot a few times, including at Runtime Verification 2010, at a Galois Technical Seminar (video of the talk is here), and at a recent NASA Technical Interchange.

Copilot has had five releases since we originally open-sourced the project.  Recent work has focused on making the language more straightforward and improving Copilot libraries.  But first, let me remind you how to use Copilot: you can compile specs to hard real-time C code, you can interpret them, you can model-check them, and you can generate specs to test the compiler and interpreter—you can see a bit about usage here.

For example, here’s a Copilot specification that generates the Fibonacci sequence (over Word64s) and tests for even numbers:

fib :: Streams
fib = do
let f = varW64 "f"
let t = varB "t"
f .= [0,1] ++ f + (drop 1 f)
t .= even f
where even :: Spec Word64 -> Spec Bool
even w' = w' mod 2 == 0

Notice that lists look almost exactly like Haskell lists.

What about something a little more complicated?  Consider the property:

If the temperature rises more than 2.3 degrees within 2 seconds, then the engine has been shut off.

We might use a Copilot specification like the following to express it, assuming that temp and shutoff are C variables being sampled at phases 1 and 2 respectively, and the period of execution is 1 second:

engine :: Streams
engine = do
-- external vars
let temp     = extF "temp" 1
let shutoff  = extB "shutoff" 2
-- Copilot vars
let temps    = varF "temps"
let overTemp = varB "overTemp"
let trigger  = varB "trigger"
-- Copilot specification
temps    .= [0, 0, 0] ++ temp
overTemp .= drop 2 temps > 2.3 + temps
trigger  .= overTemp ==> shutoff

Here’s something that I think shows why you want to write your DSLs in Haskell: Haskell gives you a macro language for your DSL… for free.  For example, consider the following (more complicated) property:

“If the engine temperature exeeds 250 degrees, then the engine is shut off within one second, and in the 0.1 second following the shutoff, the cooler is engaged and remains engaged.”

We can more succinctly specify this property using past-time linear temporal logic (ptLTL).  There’s a Copilot library for writing those kind of specs, which can be interspersed with normal Copilot streams—the ptLTL specs are highlighted in blue below.  Again, assume a period of execution of 1 second:

engine :: Streams
engine = do
-- external vars
let engineTemp = extW8 "engineTemp" 1
let engineOff  = extB "engineOff" 1
let coolerOn   = extB "coolerOn" 1
-- Copilot vars
let cnt        = varW8 "cnt"
let temp       = varB "temp"
let cooler     = varB "cooler"
let off        = varB "off"
let monitor    = varB "monitor"
-- Copilot specification
temp    ptltl (alwaysBeen (engineTemp > 250))
cnt     .=      [0] ++ mux (temp && cnt < 10) (cnt + 1) cnt
off     .=      cnt >= 10 ==> engineOff
cooler  ptltl (coolerOn since engineOff)
monitor .=      off && cooler

Today, I finished updating another feature of Copilot: the ability to send stream values over ports to other components in a distributed system. We had an implementation of this, but it was a bit hacky. Hopefully, it’s a bit less hacky now. For example, consider the following specification:

distrib :: Streams
distrib = do
-- Copilot vars
let a = varW8 "a"
let b = varB "b"
-- Copilot spec
a .= [0,1] ++ a + 1
b .= mod a 2 == 0
-- send commands
send "portA" (port 2) a 1
send "portB" (port 1) b 2

The blue commands are send commands.  For example, the first command says, “call the C function portA(str, num), where argument str is the value of stream a and num is port number 1.” The port number says who to send it to.

These are just a few of the recent updates. We’re still working on Copilot, so let me know if you have questions or comments.

Interested? Get Copilot on Hackage or GitHub.

### Copilot: a DSL for Monitoring Embedded Systems

September 25, 2010

In case you missed all the excitement on the Galois blog, what follows is a re-post.

# Introducing Copilot

Can you write a list in Haskell? Then you can write embedded C code using Copilot. Here’s a Copilot program that computes the Fibonacci sequence (over Word 64s) and tests for even a numbers:


fib :: Streams
fib = do
"fib" .= [0,1] ++ var "fib" + (drop 1 $varW64 "fib") "t" .= even (var "fib") where even :: Spec Word64 -> Spec Bool even w = w mod const 2 == const 0  Copilot contains an interpreter, a compiler, and uses a model-checker to check the correctness of your program. The compiler generates constant time and constant space C code via Tom Hawkin’s Atom Language (thanks Tom!). Copilot is specifically developed to write embedded software monitors for more complex embedded systems, but it can be used to develop a variety of functional-style embedded code. Executing > compile fib "fib" baseOpts generates fib.c and fib.h (with a main() for simulation—other options change that). We can then run > interpret fib 100 baseOpts to check that the Copilot program does what we expect. Finally, if we have CBMC installed, we can run > verify "fib.c" to prove a bunch of memory safety properties of the generated program. Galois has open-sourced Copilot (BSD3 licence). More information is available on the Copilot homepage. Of course, it’s available from Hackage, too. # Flight of the Navigator Copilot took its maiden flight in August 2010 in Smithfield, Virginia. NASA rents a private airfield for test flights like this, but you have to get past the intimidating sign posted upon entering the airfield. However, once you arrive, there’s a beautiful view of the James River. We were flying on a RC aircraft that NASA Langley uses to conduct a variety of Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) experiments. (It coincidentally had Galois colors!) Our experiments for Copilot were to determine its effectiveness at detecting faults in embedded guidance, navigation, and control software. The test-bed we flew was a partially fault-tolerant pitot tube (air pressure) sensor. Our pitot tube sat at the edge of the wing. Pitot tubes are used on commercial aircraft and they’re a big deal: a number of aircraft accidents and mishaps have been due, in part, to pitot tube failures. Our experiment consisted of a beautiful hardware stack, crafted by Sebastian Niller of the Technische Universität Ilmenau. Sebastian also led the programming for the stack. The stack consisted of four STM32 ARM Cortex M3 microprocessors. In addition, there was an SD card for writing flight data, and power management. The stack just fit into the hull of the aircraft. Sebastian installed our stack in front of another stack used by NASA on the same flights. The microprocessors were arranged to provide Byzantine fault-tolerance on the sensor values. One microprocessor acted as the general, receiving inputs from the pitot tube and distributing those values to the other microprocessors. The other microprocessors would exchange their values and perform a fault-tolerant vote on them. Granted, the fault-tolerance was for demonstration purposes only: all the microprocessors ran off the same clock, and the sensor wasn’t replicated (we’re currently working on a fully fault-tolerant system). During the flight tests, we injected (in software) faults by having intermittently incorrect sensor values distributed to various nodes. The pitot sensor system (including the fault-tolerance code) is a hard real-time system, meaning events have to happen at predefined deadlines. We wrote it in a combination of Tom Hawkin’s Atom, a Haskell DSL that generates C, and C directly. Integrated with the pitot sensor system are Copilot-generated monitors. The monitors detected • unexpected sensor values (e.g., the delta change is too extreme), • the correctness of the voting algorithm (we used Boyer-Moore majority voting, which returns the majority only if one exists; our monitor checked whether a majority indeed exists), and • whether the majority votes agreed. The monitors integrated with the sensor system without disrupting its real-time behavior. We gathered data on six flights. In between flights, we’d get the data from the SD card. We took some time to pose with the aircraft. The Copilot team from left to right is Alwyn Goodloe, National Institute of Aerospace; Lee Pike, Galois, Inc.; Robin Morisset, École Normale Supérieure; and Sebastian Niller, Technische Universität Ilmenau. Robin and Sebastian are Visiting Scholars at the NIA for the project. Thanks for all the hard work! There were a bunch of folks involved in the flight test that day, and we got a group photo with everyone. We are very thankful that the researchers at NASA were gracious enough to give us their time and resources to fly our experiments. Thank you! Finally, here are two short videos. The first is of our aircraft’s takeoff during one of the flights. Interestingly, it has an electric engine to reduce the engine vibration’s effects on experiments. http://player.vimeo.com/video/15198286 The second is of AirStar, which we weren’t involved in, but that also flew the same day. AirStar is a scaled-down jet (yes, jet) aircraft that was really loud and really fast. I’m posting its takeoff, since it’s just so cool. That thing was a rocket! http://player.vimeo.com/video/15204969 # More Details Copilot and the flight test is part of a NASA-sponsored project (NASA press-release) led by Lee Pike at Galois. It’s a 3 year project, and we’re currently in the second year. # Even More Details Besides the language and flight test, we’ve written a few papers: • Lee Pike, Alwyn Goodloe, Robin Morisset, and Sebastian Niller. Copilot: A Hard Real-Time Runtime Monitor. To appear in the proceedings of the 1st Intl. Conference on Runtime Verification (RV’2010), 2010. Springer. This paper describes the Copilot language. Byzantine faults are fascinating. Here’s a 2-page paper that shows one reason why. At the beginning of our work, we tried to survey prior results in the field and discuss the constraints of the problem. This report is a bit lengthy (almost 50 pages), but it’s a gentle introduction to our problem space. Yes, QuickCheck can be used to test low-level protocols. A short paper motivating the need for runtime monitoring of critical embedded systems. # You’re Still Interested? We’re always looking for collaborators, users, and we may need 1-2 visiting scholars interested in embedded systems & Haskell next summer. If any of these interest you, drop Lee Pike a note (hint: if you read any of the papers or download Copilot, you can find my email). ### 10 to the -9 January 24, 2010 $10^{-9}$, or one-in-a-billion, is the famed number given for the maximum probability of a catastrophic failure, per hour of operation, in life-critical systems like commercial aircraft. The number is part of the folklore of the safety-critical systems literature; where does it come from? First, it’s worth noting just how small that number is. As pointed out by Driscoll et al. in the paper, Byzantine Fault Tolerance, from Theory to Reality, the probability of winning the U.K. lottery is 1 in 10s of millions, and the probability of being struck by lightening (in the U.S.) is $1.6 \times 10^{-6},$ more than a 1,000 times more likely than $10^{-9}.$ So where did $10^{-9}$ come from? A nice explanation comes from a recent paper by John Rushby: If we consider the example of an airplane type with 100 members, each flying $3000$ hours per year over an operational life of 33 years, then we have a total exposure of about 107 flight hours. If hazard analysis reveals ten potentially catastrophic failures in each of ten subsystems, then the “budget” for each, if none are expected to occur in the life of the fleet, is a failure probability of about $10^{-9}$ per hour [1, page 37]. This serves to explain the well-known $10^{-9}$ requirement, which is stated as follows: “when using quantitative analyses. . . numerical probabilities. . . on the order of $10^{-9}$ per flight-hour. . . based on a flight of mean duration for the airplane type may be used. . . as aids to engineering judgment. . . to. . . help determine compliance” (with the requirement for extremely improbable failure conditions) [2, paragraph 10.b]. [1] E. Lloyd and W. Tye, Systematic Safety: Safety Assessment of Aircraft Systems. London, England: Civil Aviation Authority, 1982, reprinted 1992. [2] System Design and Analysis, Federal Aviation Administration, Jun. 21, 1988, advisory Circular 25.1309-1A. (By the way, it’s worth reading the rest of the paper—it’s the first attempt I know of to formally connect the notions of (software) formal verification and reliability.) So there a probabilistic argument being made, but let’s spell it out in a little more detail. If there are 10 potential failures in 10 subsystems, then there are $10 \times 10 = 100$ potential failures. Thus, there are $2^{100}$ possible configurations of failure/non-failure in the subsystems. Only one of these configurations is acceptable—the one in which there are no faults. If the probability of failure is $x,$ then the probability of non-failure is $1 - x.$ So if the probability of failure for each subsystem is $10^{-9},$ then the probability of being in the one non-failure configuration is $\displaystyle(1 - 10^{-9})^{100}$ We want that probability of non-failure to be greater than the required probability of non-failure, given the total number of flight hours. Thus, $\displaystyle (1 - 10^{-9})^{100} > 1 - 10^{-7}$ which indeed holds: $\displaystyle (1 - 10^{-9})^{100} - (1 - 10^{-7})$ is around $4.95 \times 10^{-15}.$ Can we generalize the inequality? The hint for how to do so is that the number of subsystems ($100$) is no more than the overall failure rate divided by the subsystem rate: $\displaystyle \frac{10^{-7}}{10^{-9}}$ This suggests the general form is something like Subsystem reliability inequality: $\displaystyle (1 - C^{-n})^{C^{n-m}} \geq 1 - C^{-m}$ where $C,$ $n,$ and $m$ are real numbers, $C \geq 1,$ $n \geq 0,$ and $n \geq m.$ Let’s prove the inequality holds. Joe Hurd figured out the proof, sketched below (but I take responsibility for any mistakes in it’s presentation). For convenience, we’ll prove the inequality holds specifically when $C = e,$ but the proof can be generalized. First, if $n = 0,$ the inequality holds immediately. Next, we’ll show that $\displaystyle (1 - e^{-n})^{e^{n-m}}$ is monotonically non-decreasing with respect to $n$ by showing that the derivative of its logarithm is greater or equal to zero for all $n > 0.$ So the derivative of its logarithm is $\displaystyle \frac{d}{dn} \; e^{n-m}\ln(1-e^{-n}) = e^{n-m}\ln(1-e^{-n})+\frac{e^{-m}}{1-e^{-n}}$ We show $\displaystyle e^{n-m}\ln(1-e{-n})+\frac{e^{-m}}{1-e^{-n}} \geq 0$ iff $\displaystyle e^{-m}\left(e^{n}\ln(1-e^{-n}) + \frac{1}{1-e^{-n}}\right) \geq 0$ and since $e^{-m} \geq 0,$ $\displaystyle e^{n}\ln(1-e^{-n}) + \frac{1}{1-e^{-n}} \geq 0$ iff $\displaystyle e^{n}\ln(1-e^{-n}) \geq - \frac{1}{1-e^{-n}}$ Let $x = e^{-n}$, so the range of $x$ is $0 < x < 1.$ $\displaystyle\ln(1-x) \geq - \frac{x}{1-x}$ Now we show that in the range of $x$, the left-hand side is bounded below by the right-hand side of the inequality. $\displaystyle \lim_{x \to 0} \; \ln(1-x) = 0$ and $\displaystyle - \frac{x}{1-x} = 0$ Now taking their derivatives $\displaystyle \frac{d}{dx} \; \ln(1-x) = \frac{1}{x-1}$ and $\displaystyle \frac{d}{dx} \; - \frac{x}{1-x} = - \frac{1}{(x-1)^2}$ Because $\displaystyle x-1 \geq - (x-1)^2$ in the range of $x$, our proof holds. The purpose of this post was to clarify the folklore of ultra-reliable systems. The subsystem reliability inequality presented allows for easy generalization to other reliable systems. Thanks again for the help, Joe! (more…) ### Finding Boole August 10, 2009 Here’s a simple challenge-problem for model-checking Boolean functions: Suppose you want to compute some Boolean function $spec :: B^k \rightarrow B$, where $B^k$ represents 0 or more Boolean arguments. Let $f_0$, $f_1$, $\ldots$, $f_j$ range over 2-ary Boolean functions, (of type $(Bool, Bool) \rightarrow Bool$), and suppose that $f$ is a fixed composition of $f_0$, $f_1$, $\ldots$, $f_j$. (By the way, I’m going to talk about functions, but you can think of these as combinatorial circuits, if you prefer.) Our question is, “Do there exist instantiations of $f_0$, $f_1$, $\ldots$, $f_j$ such that for all inputs, $f = spec$? What is interesting to me is that our question is quantified and of the form, “exists a forall b …”, and it is “higher-order” insofar as we want to find whether there exist satisfying functions. That said, the property is easy to encode as a model-checking problem. Here, I’ll encode it into SRI’s Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) using its BDD engine. (The SAL file in its entirety is here.) To code the problem in SAL, we’ll first define for convenience a shorthand for the built-in type, BOOLEAN: B: TYPE = BOOLEAN; And we’ll define an enumerated data type representing the 16 possible 2-ary Boolean functions: B2ARY: TYPE = { False, Nor, NorNot, NotA, AndNot, NotB, Xor, Nand , And, Eqv, B, NandNot, A, OrNot, Or, True}; Now we need an application function that takes an element f from B2ARY and two Boolean arguments, and depending on f, applies the appropriate 2-ary Boolean function: app(f: B2ARY, a: B, b: B): B = IF f = False THEN FALSE ELSIF f = Nor THEN NOT (a OR b) ELSIF f = NorNot THEN NOT a AND b ELSIF f = NotA THEN NOT a ELSIF f = AndNot THEN a AND NOT b ELSIF f = NotB THEN NOT b ELSIF f = Xor THEN a XOR b ELSIF f = Nand THEN NOT (a AND b) ELSIF f = And THEN a AND b ELSIF f = Eqv THEN NOT (a XOR b) ELSIF f = B THEN b ELSIF f = NandNot THEN NOT a OR b ELSIF f = A THEN a ELSIF f = OrNot THEN a OR NOT b ELSIF f = Or THEN a OR b ELSE TRUE ENDIF; Let’s give a concrete definition to f and say that it is the composition of five 2-ary Boolean functions, f0 through f4. In the language of SAL: f(b0: B, b1: B, b2: B, b3: B, b4: B, b5: B): [[B2ARY, B2ARY, B2ARY, B2ARY, B2ARY] -> B] = LAMBDA (f0: B2ARY, f1: B2ARY, f2: B2ARY, f3: B2ARY, f4: B2ARY): app(f0, app(f1, app(f2, b0, app(f3, app(f4, b1, b2), b3)), b4), b5); Now let’s define the spec function that f should implement: spec(b0: B, b1: B, b2: B, b3: B, b4: B, b5: B): B = (b0 AND b1) OR (b2 AND b3) OR (b4 AND b5); Now, we’ll define a module m; modules are SAL’s building blocks for defining state machines. However, in our case, we won’t define an actual state machine since we’re only modeling function composition (or combinatorial circuits). The module has variables corresponding the function inputs, function identifiers, and a Boolean stating whether f is equivalent to its specification (we’ll label the classes of variables INPUT, LOCAL, and OUTPUT, to distinguish them, but for our purposes, the distinction doesn’t matter). m: MODULE = BEGIN INPUT b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 : B LOCAL f0, f1, f2, f3, f4 : B2ARY OUTPUT equiv : B DEFINITION equiv = FORALL (b0: B, b1: B, b2: B, b3: B, b4: B, b5: B): spec(b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) = f(b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5)(f0, f1, f2, f3, f4); END; Notice we’ve universally quantified the free variables in spec and the definition of f. Finally, all we have to do is state the following theorem: instance : THEOREM m |- NOT equiv; Asking whether equiv is false in module m. Issuing $ sal-smc FindingBoole.sal instance

asks SAL’s BDD-based model-checker to solve theorem instance. In a couple of seconds, SAL says the theorem is proved. So spec can’t be implemented by f, for any instantiation of f0 through f4! OK, what about

spec(b0: B, b1: B, b2: B, b3: B, b4: B, b5: B): B =
TRUE;

Issuing

\$ sal-smc FindingBoole.sal instance

we get a counterexample this time:

f0 = True
f1 = NandNot
f2 = NorNot
f3 = And
f4 = Xor

which is an assignment to the function symbols. Obviously, to compute the constant TRUE, only the outermost function, f0, matters, and as we see, it is defined to be TRUE.

By the way, the purpose of defining the enumerated type B2ARY should be clear now—if we hadn’t, SAL would just return a mess in which the value of each function f0 through f4 is enumerated:

f0(false, false) = true
f0(true, false) = true
f0(false, true) = true
f0(true, true) = true
f1(false, false) = true
f1(true, false) = true
f1(false, true) = false
f1(true, true) = true
f2(false, false) = false
f2(true, false) = true
f2(false, true) = false
f2(true, true) = false
f3(false, false) = false
f3(true, false) = false
f3(false, true) = false
f3(true, true) = true
f4(false, false) = false
f4(true, false) = true
f4(false, true) = true
f4(true, true) = false

OK, let’s conclude with one more spec:

spec(b0: B, b1: B, b2: B, b3: B, b4: B, b5: B): B =
(NOT (b0 AND ((b1 OR b2) XOR b3)) AND b4) XOR b5;

This is implementable by f, and SAL returns

f0 = Eqv
f1 = OrNot
f2 = And
f3 = Eqv
f4 = Nor

Although these assignments compute the same function, they differ from those in our specification. Just to double-check, we can ask SAL if they’re equivalent:

spec1(b0: B, b1: B, b2: B, b3: B, b4: B, b5: B): B =
((b0 AND ((NOT (b1 OR b2))  b3)) OR NOT b4)  b5;

specifies the assignments returned, and

eq: THEOREM m |- spec(b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) =  spec1(b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5);

asks if the two specifications are equivalent. They are.